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Employee Benefits Law: Securing Employee Welfare
Benefits Through ERISA
Congress designed the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 19741 (ERISA) "to promote the interests of employees and
their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans." 2 Employee welfare
benefit plans are one category of ERISA's benefit plans.3 Welfare
benefit plans comprise a substantial portion of employment bene-
fits subject to ERISA,4 and include fringe benefits such as medical,
disability, and unemployment insurance.5 These plans are not sub-
ject to ERISA's stringent vesting and funding requirements. 6 They
are also exempt from state statutory and decisional law which "re-
late to" such plans.7 Thus, a gap exists in ERISA's remedial frame-
work which makes it difficult for participants in welfare benefit
plans to secure their rights under such plans. 8 Because of the po-
tential for abuse by plan providers9 and because of the serious
consequences that loss of benefits has for current and retired em-
1 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
2 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983). See also 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)
(1982).
3 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(B) (1982) (distinguishes employee welfare benefit plans from
employee benefit plans which include pensions).
4 Note, ERISA: Preemption of State Health Care Laws and Worker Well-Being, 1981 U. ILL.
L. REv. 825, 831.
5 See text accompanying note 22 infra for examples of employee welfare benefit plans.
6 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(1), 1081(a)(1) (1982). See Hansen v. White Farm Equip. Co., 42
Bankr. 1005, 1012 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
7 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
8 ERISA preempts state statutory and contract claims. Sly v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 712
F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1983); International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, and Ornamental Iron
Workers Local No. 111 v. Douglas, 646 F.2d 1211, 1215 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 866
(1981); Pierce v. NECA-IBEW Welfare Trust Fund, 488 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Tenn. 1978),
aff'd, 620 F.2d 589 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980); Turner v. Local No. 302,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1979). See also cases cited at note 33
infra. A practitioner who brings a claim for welfare benefits under state law should antici-
pate additional challenges based upon failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the
plan, removal to federal court, and statute of limitations.
9 Corporate Retiree Health Benefits: Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?: Hearing Before the Select
Comm. on Aging House ofRep., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984) (statement of Rep. Oakar) [here-
inafter cited as Hearings on Aging]; Oversight Hearing on Employee Welfare Benefit Plans: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the Comm. on Education and Labor on H.R.
5475, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984) (testimony of John Crawford, Gulf Annuities Ass'n)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on Labor-Management Relations]; id. at 19 (statement of Robert
A.G. Monks, Administrator, Office of Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs, U.S. Dep't of
Labor). See also Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1483, 1497 (M.D. Tenn.
1985), where the court stated: "To permit the enforcement of termination/modification
clauses without a showing of good cause has the effect of reducing the status of hard earned
welfare benefits to mere gratuities."
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ployees,10 Congress and the federal courts are beginning to protect
employee welfare benefits through a variety of legal theories. This
note examines each of these theories and determines which best
achieves ERISA's goal of promoting employee interests in benefit
plans.
Part I of this note examines ERISA's scheme for regulating em-
ployee welfare benefit plans. Part II traces the development of the
"federal common law"11 of ERISA with respect to employee wel-
fare benefit plans. Part III examines how employees can secure
welfare benefits under ERISA's fiduciary requirements and sug-
gests expanding these duties to better protect employee benefit
rights. Part IV evaluates legislative alternatives for promoting em-
ployee interests in welfare benefit plans. Finally, Part V concludes
that the courts must continue to protect welfare benefit rights
through the common law of ERISA until Congress determines how
to promote the interests of employees in welfare benefit plans.
10 Witnesses have testified at congressional hearings about the hardship they suffered
because their employer changed their welfare benefit plan. Bessemer Cement Co. em-
ployed August Anderson for 33 years. The personnel manager told him that when he re-
tired the company would continue to provide his benefits for life. The company, however,
stopped providing his benefits despite an arbitration award requiring them to do so. Mr.
Anderson was thus forced to pay $312 per month for insurance coverage. In 1982 he had
open heart surgery which cost $17,000. See Hearings on Aging, supra note 9, at 6 (statement
of August Anderson).
The Crucible Steel Plant, operated by Colt Industries in Midland, Pa. had 4,118 plan
beneficiaries. The plan promised lifelong benefits to retirees. Colt made several proposals
to provide benefits to their former employees through lump sum payouts and to find a
successor to operate its complete facility. These attempts, however, were either unaccept-
able to employees or failed. Colt closed the mill and later sold it to a successor who em-
ployed one-fifteenth of the previous employees. Former employees such as Robert
Zielinski were left without medical benefits. In 1983 Zielinski was 82 years old. He suffered
from hearing and vision loss as well as severe arthritis. His health problems were attributa-
ble to his 38 years of service in the steel-floored hand mill of the plant. Other former
employees, such as Mrs. Eleanor Nevish, would pay $200 a month for medical insurance on
a pension of $250 a month. See Hearings on Aging, supra note 9, at 11-16 (statement of Rev.
Mike Garner).
Early retirees also face substantial hardship when their former employer changes the
level of their benefits because they do not become eligible for medicare until they reach 65
years of age. If the employer eliminates their medical coverage, the employees could be
subject to substantial liability. R.T. Doyle, a retiree of Gulf Oil Co., has cancer and requires
extensive medical treatment. In 1983, his medical bills exceeded $60,000. Mr. Doyle was
not covered by Medicare. If the terms of the Gulf plan were changed pursuant to a merger,
Mr. Doyle would have been required to sell his home and other assets to cover his medical
expenses. See Hearings on Labor-Management Relations, supra note 9, at 6-7 (testimony ofJohn
Crawford, Gulf Annuities Ass'n). See also Reducing Retiree's Health Benefits: The Courts Develop
a Remedy, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1399 (1985) (citing retiree's dependence on health insur-
ance due to fixed incomes, lack of bargaining power with the employer, and lack of union
representation); Note, supra note 4, at 830-31; Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 615 F. Supp.
1483, 1496 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
11 While Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny prevented
federal courts from creating federal common law, the courts have fashioned a rule of com-
mon law in a number of situations. See text accompanying notes 39-44 infra.,
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I. ERISA's Scheme For Regulating Employee
Welfare Benefit Plans
ERISA does not require employers or employee organizations
to establish employee benefit plans. 12 Once an employer elects to
establish a benefit plan, it must comply with ERISA's regulations.
13
ERISA divides employee benefit plans into two categories: 14 pen-
sion benefit plans' 5 and employee welfare benefit plans.' 6 Pension
benefit plans provide income to retirees.17 Employee welfare bene-
fit plans apply to both retired and active employees and include all
benefits not included in pension plans.'
8
Unlike pension plans, welfare benefit plans are not subject to
the full scope of ERISA's requirements.' 9 Congress exempted wel-
fare benefit plans from some of the requirements under the Act in
an effort to provide meaningful reform and yet keep costs within
reasonable limits. 20 This created a gap in the statute's protection of
welfare benefit plans.
ERISA pension benefit plans include plans which provide in-
come to retirees and plans which defer an employee's income until
termination of employment.2 1 All other employee benefits are cov-
ered under welfare benefit plans. ERISA enumerates several types
of welfare benefit plans including:
medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits, or benefits in the
event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment,
or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs,
or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal ser-
vices.
22
Welfare benefit plans and employee pension plans are subject
to most of the same requirements. 23 All plans are subject to ER-
ISA's reporting and disclosure requirements, 24 fiduciary responsi-
12 "[T]his subchapter shall apply to any employee benefit plan if it is established or main-
tained." 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1982) (emphasis added). See note 65 infra.
13 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1982). Section 1003(b) exempts governmental plans, church
plans, plans maintained to comply with workman's compensation laws, plans maintained
outside of the United States, and excess benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1982).
14 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l)(B) (1982).
15 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1982).
16 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982).
17 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(i) (1982).
18 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(B) (1982).
19 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
20 See text accompanying note 63 infra.
21 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(i-ii) (1982).
22 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (1982).
23 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1982).
24 These requirements include the following: providing each participant with a sum-
mary plan description; filing a summary plan description and terminal reports with the Sec-
retary of Labor; and providing participants and the Secretary of Labor with a summary of
any material modification of the plan. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1022 (1982). See generally B.
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bilities, 25  and administration and enforcement provisions.2 6
Welfare benefit plans, however, are exempt from ERISA's partici-
pation and vesting requirements, 27 and from ERISA's funding re-
quirements. 28 As a result of these exemptions, participants attain
only limited statutory rights to welfare benefits.
Employees have difficulty securing rights under welfare benefit
plans because ERISA's enforcement provisions are only geared to-
ward enforcement of vested rights. 29 ERISA's preemption of state
law compounds this difficulty.30 ERISA supersedes all state laws
which "relate to any employee benefit plan." 31 Because preemp-
tion applies to both state statutory and case law,3 2 it encompasses
CREED, ERISA COMPLIANCE REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE (1981); R. BILDERSEE, PENSION
REGULATION MANUAL 285-310 (1979) (citing three levels of reporting and disclosure:
mandatory disclosure, requested distribution, and examination availability); J. MAMORSKY,
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: ERISA AND BEYOND § 10 (1985). See also Blau v. Del Monte
Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1353-54 (9th Cir. 1984) (procedural violations may cause substantive
harm which the court may consider in determining if the fiduciary standards were
breached), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 183 (1985).
25 [A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the inter-
est of the participants and beneficiaries and. . .(B) with the care, skill, prudence,
and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting
in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims ...(D) in accordance with the
documents and instruments governing the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982). In evaluating a fiduciary's actions under this standard, courts
apply the test of whether the action was arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith. Malhiot v.
Southern Cal. Retail Clerks Union, 735 F.2d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. deniedsub nom.
Jampol v. Southern Cal. Retail Clerks Union, 105 S. Ct. 959 (1985). See generally G. RAY &
H. LAMON, FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE NEw PENSION REFORM ACT 1-26n
(Supp. 1976); R. BILDERSEE, supra note 24, at 313-34; J. MAMORSKY, supra note 24, § 12.
26 A participant or beneficiary may bring a civil action for the administrator's refusal to
supply requested information, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(A) (1982), and "to recover benefits
due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or
to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) (1982).
A participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary may bring a civil action to enjoin violations of
the act or to obtain equitable relief, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1982), and along with the
Secretary of Labor, may bring a civil action for breach of fiduciary duty, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(2) (1982). The Secretary of Labor is also empowered to bring civil actions in
other limited circumstances. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(4) (1982).
Any person who willfully violates any reporting and disclosure requirement is subject
to criminal penalties of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment of up to one year, or both.
Violations by corporations or other entities are subject to a fine not exceeding $100,000.
29 U.S.C. § 1131 (1982).
27 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (1982).
28 29 U.S.C. § 1081 (1982).
29 The enforcement provisions limit civil actions to actions to recover "benefits due" or
to enforce or clarify "rights." But by allowing actions to "enjoin violations" or for "other
equitable relief," the enforcement provisions open the door to federal common law claims.
See note 26 supra.
30 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
31 Id.
32 Calhoun v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 478 F. Supp 357, 359 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
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contract law. 33 Thus, unless an independent source of federal law,
such as the law of collective bargaining agreements,3 4 granted em-
ployees a contractual right to welfare benefits, they were limited to
securing their welfare benefits through ERISA's fiduciary require-
ments.3 5 Actions under ERISA's fiduciary requirements, however,
have met with little success.
3 6
"ERISA's legislative history indicates that, in light of the act's
virtually unique preemption provision, 'a body of Federal substan-
tive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving
rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans.' "37
Courts have seized upon this language and are beginning to de-
velop a rule of federal common law to fill the gap in ERISA's cover-
age of welfare benefit plans.
38
33 Courts have interpreted ERISA's preemption provision broadly. See Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983); Holland v. Burlington Indus., 772 F.2d 1140, 1147
(4th Cir. 1985) ("Preemption applies to a state cause of action under common law as well,
for the state breach of contract and estoppel claims pose the same potential as the statutory
cause of action for conflicting employer obligations and variable standards of recovery.");
Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., 765 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir. 1985); Musto v. American Gen.
Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1483, 1494 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). See also cases cited at note 8 supra.
34 Participants in employee welfare benefit plans which are embodied in collective bar-
gaining agreements are able to enforce contract rights under § 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (LMRA), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). Section 301 empowers the
federal courts to develop a federal common law of contracts to apply to collective bargain-
ing agreements. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
The development of the federal common law of collective bargaining agreements is
analogous to the development of federal common law under ERISA. Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1983). The two bodies of law,
however, are distinct. See id. at 24-25. Negotiated changes in a collective bargaining agree-
ment can only be overturned when they violate the law. Music v. Western Conference of
Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 712 F.2d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing United Mine
Workers of Am. Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562 (1982)). See Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2394-95 (1985). But where the
changes in the plan are made by a trustee, the action becomes subject to ERISA's fiduciary
requirements. Robinson, 455 U.S. at 574; NLRB v. Amax Coal Go., 453 U.S. 322, 332-33
(1981).
The enforcement of welfare benefit rights under collectively bargained plans is outside
the scope of this note. However, Part III, infra, which discusses enforcing welfare benefit
rights through ERISA's fiduciary requirements, applies to collectively bargained plans.
35 Ogden v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 571 F. Supp. 520, 522 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (court
struck allegations which did not state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty from the
complaint).
36 It is difficult to prove that the fiduciary breached his duty because the courts give
great deference to the fiduciary, similar to appellate review of administrative rulings. See
note 145 infra and accompanying text. Claims are less likely to succeed when the fiduciary
eliminated or modified benefits for financial reasons. Elser v. I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund,
684 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 813 (1983); Reducing Retiree's Health Bene-
fits: The Courts Develop a Remedy, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1399-1400 (1985).
37 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26
(1983) (citation omitted) (quoting 120 CoNG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (remarks of Sen.Javits)).
38 Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 106
S. Ct. 1167 (1986); Holland v. Burlington Indus., 772 F.2d 1140 (4th Cir. 1985); Scott v.
Gulf Oil Co., 754 F.2d 1499, 1502 (9th Cir. 1985); Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
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II. The "Federal Common Law" of Welfare Benefit
Plans Under ERISA
The federal courts do not have the power to establish a federal
common law.39 The power to establish law lies solely with Con-
gress.40 The courts, however, have the power to interpret laws en-
acted by Congress. 4 1 The power to interpret laws includes the
power to develop rules of decision where Congress has not spoken
on an issue or where a conflict exists between a federal interest and
state law.42 The United States Supreme Court has recently adopted
rules of common law in deciding pension plan issues under ER-
ISA.43 Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead by
developing a common law of welfare benefit plans.44 Because the
development of federal common law depends upon Congress' inac-
tivity on a particular issue,45 courts must consult the legislative his-
tory of ERISA before determining that they have the power to
develop common law with respect to an issue.
A. The Legislative History of Welfare Benefit Plans
All of the courts that apply common law to welfare benefit
plans find authority to do so in the legislative history of ERISA.46
They derive this authority from three sources: a statement by Sena-
torJavits, 47 an analogy by the joint Conference Committee on Pen-
sion Reform to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act48 (LMRA), and the underlying policy of ERISA.49 But courts
Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1984); Terpinas v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, 722 F.2d 1445,
1447 (9th Cir. 1984); Woodfork v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 642 F.2d 966, 973 (5th
Cir. 1981); Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1483 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); Adcock v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 616 F. Supp. 409, 414 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); Eardman v. Beth-
lehem Steel Corp. Employee Welfare Benefit Plans, 607 F. Supp. 196 (W.D.N.Y. 1985);
Hansen v. White Farm Equip. Co., 42 Bankr. 1005 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Wayne Chemical, Inc.
v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316, 322 (N.D. Ind.), af'd as modified, 567
F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977).
39 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312-14 (1981).
40 Id. at 313.
41 See id. at 314.
42 Id. at 314.
43 Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 105 S. Ct. 3085, 3098 n.18 (1985)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v.
Central Transport, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2833, 2840-41 (1985) (and cases cited therein).
44 Adcock v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 616 F. Supp. 409, 415 (M.D. Tenn. 1985);
Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1483, 1497 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); Hansen v.
White Farm Equip. Co., 42 Bankr. 1005, 1014 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
45 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313-14 (1981).
46 See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
47 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, 4771 (1976). See.
e.g., Adcock, 616 F. Supp. at 415; Hansen, 42 Bankr. at 1015.
48 JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. REP. No.
1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE
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ignore competing inferences of congressional intent which they
could draw from the legislative history and from the Act itself.50
The courts primarily rely on a statement of Senator Javits as
authority for creating a rule of federal common law with respect to
welfare benefit plans. During debate over the Report of the Con-
ference Committee on Pension Reform 5' SenatorJavits said, "[I]t is
also intended that a body of federal substantive law will be devel-
oped by the courts to deal with issues involving rights under private
welfare and pension plans." 52 Courts have used this statement as
carte blanche for developing a common law of welfare benefit
plans.53 Many courts have not searched beyond this statement to
determine Congress' intent.54
Some courts have also relied upon a House conference report
which provides that courts should regard ERISA claims as arising
under the laws of the United States in a similar fashion to claims
under section 301 of the LMRA. 55 These courts reason that be-
cause federal common law is appropriate for determining claims
under section 301, it should also apply to ERISA.
56
The final source of congressional authority which courts look
to when developing common law is the underlying policy of ER-
ISA.57 These courts cite ERISA's policies to protect employee in-
terests in benefit plans and to provide access to federal courts to
conclude that Congress intended the federal courts to protect inter-
ests through federal common law.58
The legislative history of ERISA can also support the opposite
position that Congress did not intend for the courts to fill the gap
in ERISA's regulatory scheme. Several courts have refused to apply
federal common law to ERISA "[w]here Congress has established
an extensive regulatory network and has expressly announced its
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY AcT OF 1974, 4277, 4594 (1976) and 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5038, 5107 [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REP.]. See, e.g., Hansen, 42 Bankr.
at 1015.
49 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982). See, e.g., Adcock, 616 F. Supp. at 414; Wayne Chemical,
Inc., 426 F. Supp. at 322.
50 See notes 59-68 infra and accompanying text.
51 See CONFERENCE REP., supra note 48.
52 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, 4771 (1976).
53 Adcock, 616 F. Supp. at 415; Hansen, 42 Bankr. at 1015. See also Scott v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1509 (9th Cir. 1985) (and cases cited therein); Wayne Chemical, Inc.,
426 F. Supp. at 321.
54 Scott, 754 F.2d at 1501-02; Terpinas v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, 722 F.2d 1445, 1447
(9th Cir. 1984).
55 See CONFERENCE REP., supra note 48.
56 See, e.g., Hansen, 42 Bankr. at 1015.
57 See cases cited at note 49 supra.
58 Id.
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intention to occupy a field." 59 Congress announced its intention to
occupy the field of employee benefit plans through ERISA's broad
preemption clause 60 and policy of uniform regulation of employee
benefit plans.61 When Congress established ERISA's regulatory
network, it expressly announced its intent to create the gap in ER-
ISA's regulation of welfare benefit plans. Yet courts are using com-
mon law to fill this gap by vesting contract rights to welfare benefits
in employees. 62 Congress considered this alternative, and in strik-
ing a balance "between providing meaningful reform and keeping
costs within reasonable limits," 63 it chose to require vesting of pen-
sion but not of welfare benefit plans. 64 Congress was concerned
that if it placed too onerous of a financial burden on employers,
they would refuse to establish benefit plans. 65
Congress again considered extending vesting requirements to
welfare benefit plans in 1984.66 After considering the complexity of
issues regarding which benefits should vest and when they should
vest, 67 Congress chose to forgo such a move. Because Congress
has considered this issue and has twice refused to create a vesting
requirement for welfare benefit plans, courts should not contravene
59 Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 312 (3d Cir. 1982). See also Stone &
Webster Engineering Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323, 329 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Arcudi
v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., 463 U.S. 1220 (1983); Dependahl v. Falstaff Brew-
ing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1215 (8th Cir. 1981).
60 "Congress used the words 'relate to' in § 514(a) in their broad sense." Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983).
61 "This broad preemption furthers a major policy of ERISA-uniformity in employee
benefit laws." Holland v. Burlington Indus., 772 F.2d 1140, 1147 n.5 (4th Cir. 1985) (em-
phasis in original). See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
62 Adcock, 616 F. Supp. at 419; Hansen, 42 Bankr. at 1018.
63 S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4890, 4904.
64 Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (1982). See also CONFERENCE REP., supra note 48, H.R. 1280 at
273, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 4540 and 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
5054.
65 [S]ince these plans are voluntary on the part of the employer and both the insti-
tution of new pension plans and increases in benefits depend upon employer will-
ingness to participate or expand a plan, it is necessary to take into account
additional costs from the standpoint of the employer. If employers respond to
more comprehensive coverage, vesting and funding rules by decreasing benefits
under existing plans or slowing the rate of formation of new plans, little if any-
thing would be gained from the standpoint of securing broader use of employee
pensions and related plans.
S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4890, 4904. Employers are beginning to respond to common law vesting as Congress pre-
dicted: by seeking ways to avoid liability under welfare benefit plans. See Van Olson,
Nonpension Retiree Benefits: Are The), For Life? Management Guidelines to the Issue, 36 LAB. LJ.
402 (1985).
66 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 § 561, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 854.
67 See Hearings on Labor-Management Relations, supra note 9, at 21 (statement of Robert
A.G. Monks, Administrator, Office of Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs, U.S. Dep't of
Labor).
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Congress' intent by creating a common law vesting requirement in
this area.68
Despite the diverse conclusions that could be drawn from
ERISA's legislative history, courts have begun to create federal
common law to regulate welfare benefit plans. The development of
the common law of welfare benefit plans has paralleled contract law
principles. Although too few reported cases exist to establish a
trend, two theories are emerging in recent cases. They are the
traditional contract theory and the status theory.
B. Contract Theory
In the past, employees could enforce rights to welfare benefits
through contract law principles. Employees whose plan was em-
bodied in a collective bargaining agreement could enforce their
contract rights under section 301 of the LMRA.69 Employees cov-
ered by other plans could enforce their rights under state law.70
ERISA's preemption provision, however, eliminated enforcement
under state law, 71 thus creating a class of plan participants who did
not have a forum to enforce their rights.
Federal courts have begun to restore a mechanism for employ-
ees to enforce contractual rights 'under welfare benefit plans
through the development of a rule of common law. In recent cases,
courts have relied on state court decisions, 72 and have adopted uni-
lateral contract,73 bilateral contract,74 and estoppe 75 theories to se-
cure employees' welfare benefits. Two courts have rejected the
quasi-contract theory of unjust enrichment. 76
In Adcock v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. ,77 the United States Dis-
68 See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
69 See note 34 supra.
70 Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1971) (Va. law); Sim-
mons v. Hitt, 546 S.W.2d 587, 592 (Tenn. 1976); Sheehy v. Seilon, Inc., 10 Ohio St. 2d 242,
227 N.E.2d 229 (1967); Cantor v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 171 Ohio St. 405, 171 N.E.2d 518
(1960).
71 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
72 Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1420 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dis-
missed, 106 S. Ct. 1167 (1986); Musto, 615 F. Supp. at 1500; Adcock, 616 F. Supp. at 418;
Hansen, 42 Bankr. at 1017. See Wald & Immerman, Severance Pay and Sales of Assets, 2 LAB.
LAW. 75, 90-97 (1986).
73 Adcock, 616 F. Supp. at 418-19.
74 Musto, 615 F. Supp. at 1499.
75 Id. at 1500 (court refused to give effect to a termination/modification clause where
employees relied on the fact that the company would not exercise its right under the clause
in the past without good and sufficient cause). In Amato, 773 F.2d at 1419-20, the court
held that the employees could present evidence that they relied on a clause in the plant sale
agreement to estop the employer from asserting that they were not intended beneficiaries
of the agreement.
76 Amato, 773 F.2d at 1419; Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 310-13 (3d
Cir. 1982).
77 616 F. Supp. 409 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
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trict Court for the Middle District of Tennessee applied unilateral
contract theory in holding that the plaintiffs had a binding contrac-
tual right to severance benefits. 78 To form a unilateral contract, the
employer must communicate an offer to the employee and the em-
ployee must accept the offer by performing an act specified by the
employer. 79 The court found an offer of severance pay benefits in
the employee handbook.80 The court ruled that the employees ac-
cepted the offer by continuing service with the company, and thus
had a contractual right to severance pay.8 '
In Musto v. American General Corp. ,82 the same court applied bi-
lateral contract theory to prevent an employer from changing medi-
cal insurance benefits.8 3 Parties form a bilateral contract by
exchanging mutual promises.8 4 The court found that the em-
ployer's security program, which the employer used as a recruit-
ment device, was a promise to pay retirees medical insurance
premiums for life if the employee stayed with the company until
retirement.8 5 In return, the employee promised quality service un-
til retirement.8 6 Upon retirement, the employee discharged his
duty of quality service, thus entitling the employee to the earned
benefits which were deferred until retirement.
8 7
Finally, in Amato v. Western Union International, Inc.,88 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized the
plaintiffs' estoppel argument. In Amato, the employer contracted to
sell WUI, Inc., a holding company whose subsidiaries included
Western Union. Plaintiffs claimed they were third party benefi-
ciaries of this contract, 9 which stated that the purchaser agreed not
to take any action to reduce the employees' benefits.90 The em-
ployer claimed that the clause was intended to apply only to em-
ployees of WUI, Inc., and not to the employees of Western Union
itself.9 1 The court held that the employees could present evidence
that they relied upon the agreement to estop the company from
asserting that the employees were not third party beneficiaries of
78 Id. at 418-19.
79 Id. at 418.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 615 F. Supp. 1483 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
83 Id. at 1499. The court's labeling of the contract as unilateral was erroneous because
it involved an exchange of promises.
84 1 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 13 (3d ed. 1957).
85 Musto, 615 F. Supp. at 1486, 1499.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 1167 (1986).




the agreement. 92 The court implied that, if upon remand the em-
ployees proved that they relied upon the sales agreement, they
would obtain a contractual right to early retirement benefits.
Courts are thus using contract law as a vehicle to create rights
under ERISA welfare benefit plans where the statute fails to do so.
These courts, however, have strained to find terms from which they
can imply a contract. For example, in Adcock, the court found that
the employee accepted the employer's offer of severance pay by
continuing employment with the company. 93 To form a unilateral
contract, the offeree must perform an act specified by the offeror.
94
The court implied that continued employment was the act the em-
ployer requested, although no evidence was introduced to show
this was the act requested by the employer.95 Moreover, in Musto,
the court implied a promise on behalf of the employees to provide
quality service until retirement.96 This finding was not supported
by the evidence, yet the court relied on it to establish a contract.97
Finally, in Amato, the court allowed employees to base an estoppel
argument on an agreement to sell the company.98 One would not
normally consider sales agreements as controlling the employment
relationship.
Other courts have inferred contracts for welfare benefits from
employee handbooks, summary plan descriptions, policy manuals,
oral statements made in exit interviews, and oral statements made
by plan administrators. 99 The trend toward implying contractual
rights to welfare benefits is part of a growing trend to imply con-
tractual rights in employment relationships in general. 100 As such,
it may be seen as part of a growing movement toward affording
employees common law rights based upon their employment
status.101
C. Status Theory
A benefit which one acquires upon attaining a specified status
is a status benefit. The status most often referred to with respect to
92 Id. at 1420.
93 Adcock, 616 F. Supp. at 418.
94 See text accompanying note 79 supra.
95 Adcock, 616 F. Supp. at 418.
96 Musto, 615 F. Supp. at 1499.
97 Id.
98 Amato, 773 F.2d at 1419.
99 See Van Olson, supra note 65. See also Eardman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. Employee
Welfare Benefit Plans, 607 F. Supp. 196 (W.D.N.Y. 1985).
100 Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Note, Employee
Handbooks and Employment-At-Will Contracts, 1985 DuKE LJ. 196.
101 Wald & Wolf, Recent Developments In the Law of Employment at Will, I LAB. LAW. 533
(1985).
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welfare benefit plans is retirement. The question arises whether an
employer may change welfare benefits of employees after they re-
tire. Two courts have recently refused to allow any changes in the
level of retirees' welfare benefits. 10 2 Commentators suggest that
these courts have gone beyond contract theory and have vested
welfare benefit rights in retirees based on their status alone.103 In
doing so, however, the courts continue to rely on contract princi-
ples adopted under the federal common law of ERISA.
In UA Wv. Yard-Man, Inc. ,104 the union brought suit under sec-
tion 301 of the LMRA 0 5 to enforce retirees' rights to life and
health insurance under a collective bargaining agreement. The
agreement stated that the "Company will provide insurance bene-
fits equal to the active group.' 10 6 The company argued that because
the active group was not entitled to any benefits due to plant clo-
sure, the retirees were not entitled to benefits under the
contract. 107
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that because the context of the agreement manifested an intent that
the retirees' benefits last for life,108 the benefits vested in the em-
ployees upon reaching the status of retirement. 0 9 The court em-
phasized that the nature of the benefit alone was not sufficient to
find the intent that the benefits last for life." 0 The court found that
retirement was a condition precedent to obtaining a contractual
right to the welfare benefits."' Once the employee fulfilled the
condition by reaching retirement, he discharged his duty to his em-
102 UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007
(1984); Hansen v. White Farm Equip. Co., 42 Bankr. 1005 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
103 Shultz & Langan, Current Developments in Employee Benefits, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 732
(1985); see Van Olson, supra note 65; Reducing Retiree's Health Benefits: The Courts Develop a
Remedy, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1399 (1985).
104 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984).
105 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
106 716 F.2d at 1480 (emphasis added) (The court held that, when read in the context of
the agreement, the words "active group" manifested an intent to vest insurance benefits in
retirees for life.).
107 Id.
108 The court found this intent in: (1) the criteria for terminating benefits applied only
to active employees; (2) the fact that only spousal benefits were limited to the duration of
the collective bargaining agreement; (3) the company's promise to allow early retirees to
pay the cost of their insurance until reaching 65 (a 10 year period which outlasted the term
of the agreement); (4) the limit, in the agreement, of pension and savings plans to the term
of the agreement, while retiree benefits were not so limited; and (5) the nature of the bene-
fits. Id. at 1480-82.
109 Id. at 1482. See also Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of Am. Local Union No. 1 v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 181 n.20 (1971) (the union may not bargain away
rights which vest upon retirement; such rights are interminable and the employer's failure
to provide them is actionable under § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982)).
110 Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
111 Id.
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ployer, thereby obtaining a vested contractual right which the em-
ployer could not terminate.1 1 2 While some commentators claim
that this court granted benefits based on status alone," 3 it did not
abandon established contract principles." 4 Rather, it implied the
existence of a contract for lifetime benefits from the terms of the
agreement. 115
This issue has also arisen under ERISA. In Hansen v. White
Farm Equipment Co.,' 6 the District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio nearly abandoned contract theory and almost recognized a
pure status right in retirees to welfare benefits. The court held that
an "employer may not invoke a termination clause to cut off the
benefits of a former employee who has properly retired pursuant to
the employer's requirements." 1 17 Although the court relied on
contract theory to establish a right to benefits in the retirees," 8 it
went beyond the terms of the contract by refusing to recognize its
modification/termination clause. 19 Thus, the court needed only to
find that a welfare benefit plan existed at the time of retirement and
that the employee properly retired to hold that the welfare benefit
rights vested in the retiree.
While courts have found authority in the legislative history of
ERISA to develop a federal common law of welfare benefit plans, 120
they have no authority to vest rights to welfare benefits based solely
on status. 121 ERISA specifically exempts welfare benefit plans from
vesting.' 22 Because employees do not accrue rights to welfare ben-
efits, courts cannot grant these rights solely on the basis of the em-
ployees' status. Therefore, status theory will probably not develop
as a means to secure welfare benefits.
112 Id.
113 See note 103 supra.
114 Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479 (citing rules developed to interpret collective bargaining
agreements).
115 See note 108 supra.
116 42 Bankr. 1005 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
117 Id. at 1019.
118 Id. at 1017.
119 Id. at 1019.
120 See notes 46-58 supra and accompanying text. But see notes 59-68 supra and accompa-
nying text.
121 Rights to welfare benefits do not accrue when an employee reaches a given status.
"[The term 'accrued benefit' refers to pension or retirement benefits. The term does not
apply to ancillary benefits, such as payments of medical expenses." See CONFERENCE REP.,
supra note 48, H.R. 1280 at 273, repinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 4540 and 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5054.
122 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (1982).
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D. The Common Law's Likelihood of Success in Protecting Employees'
Welfare Benefit Rights
Employees are likely to continue to succeed in securing welfare
benefits through federal common law contract theory. Despite the
conflicting authority in the legislative history of ERISA,123 courts
are accepting this approach.' 24 The United States Supreme Court
has noted it favorably. 25 The approach offers flexibility by al-
lowing the court to balance the equities of each case. Through this
approach, courts may avoid the harsh consequences to employees
which can result from the gap in ERISA's regulatory framework, 126
and also address Congress' concern about the cost to employers.'
27
Employees may also, in effect, obtain status rights to benefits
under contract theory. If an employer changes the plan language
to avoid possible liability under contract theory, a court could con-
strue such a change as an admission by the employer that a contract
for benefits once existed. If the employer later terminates benefits,
he may face significant liability because ERISA allows for retroac-
tive reinstatement of benefits. 128 Because the exposure to liability
discourages employers from changing welfare benefit plans, the ef-
fect will be the same as if the employees accrued rights to those
benefits by their status alone.
The federal common law is a useful tool to secure enforceable
rights to welfare benefits. But once rights are secured, no mecha-
nism guarantees that the employer can provide the benefits to the
employees. Unlike pension plans, ERISA does not require a wel-
fare benefit plan to have sufficient assets (funding requirements)129
or insurance 30 to meet its obligations. The company often bears
123 See notes 46-68 supra and accompanying text.
124 Prior to 1981, no court had enforced contractual rights to welfare benefits based on
the common law of ERISA. Several courts have recently adopted this approach. See note
38 supra.
125 See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
126 See note 10 supra.
127 See text accompanying note 63 supra. Courts have rejected severance pay claims in
several instances where the employer sold the facility and the successor retained the em-
ployees without any lost time. See Holland v. Burlington Indus., 772 F.2d 1140, 1146 (4th
Cir. 1985); Sutton v. Weirton Steel Div. of Nat'l Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984); Sly v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 712 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1983);
Adcock v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 616 F.2d 409 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). In these cases,
the employees were terminated within the meaning of their plan. The courts refused to
grant severance pay to the employees where the harm to the employees was minimal and
the cost to the employer would be substantial. Adcock, 616 F. Supp. at 421.
128 See Van Olson, supra note 65, at 406.
129 29 U.S.C. § 1081 (1982). The states may, however, regulate the reserve levels of
fully insured multiple employer welfare arrangements. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(b)(6)(A) through
(D) (1982).
130 The insurance of plan benefits through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 29
U.S.C. § 1302 (1982), applies only to "nonforfeitable benefits." 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a),
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the cost of providing welfare benefits out of its operating ex-
penses. 31 If the company ceases doing business or goes bankrupt,
it may not have sufficient assets to cover the expenses of the
plan. 32 The courts have not addressed this problem through the
federal common law. The fiduciary duties of ERISA, however, may
provide a vehicle for the courts to require minimum funding of wel-
fare benefit plans through federal common law.
III. Securing Welfare Benefits Under ERISA's
Fiduciary Requirements
Participants and beneficiaries of employee welfare benefit
plans may enforce their rights to receive benefits through ERISA's
fiduciary requirements. 33 To enforce rights under the fiduciary re-
quirements, a plaintiff must show that the employer established a
welfare benefit plan and that the fiduciary breached its duty to the
plan. The plaintiff may show the existence of a welfare benefit plan
through the following elements:
(1) a "plan, fund, or program" (2) established or maintained (3)
by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, (4)
for the purpose of providing [welfare benefits], (5) to partici-
pants or their beneficiaries.' 3 4
Courts generally weigh these elements together to determine
whether the claims made against a welfare benefit plan are covered
by ERISA.' 35
Once the court determines that the employer established a wel-
fare benefit plan, the inquiry shifts to determine whether the fiduci-
ary breached its duty by denying benefits to the claimant.' 36 The
1322a(a) (1982). Nonforfeitable benefits are only those to which ERISA's vesting require-
ments apply and do not include welfare benefit plans. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp., 592 F.2d 947, 953 (7th Cir. 1979), aft'd, 446 U.S. 359 (1980).
131 See Hearings on Aging, supra note 9, at 45 (statement of Anthony J. Gajda, economist).
132 In re Erie Lackawanna Ry. Co., 548 F.2d 621, 627 (6th Cir. 1977) (dire financial
position of company in bankruptcy may preclude recovery of insurance benefit right).
133 See note 25 supra.
134 Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1371 (11th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
In determining whether a plan, fund or program (pursuant to a writing or not) is a
reality a court must determine whether from the surrounding circumstances a rea-
sonable person could ascertain the intended benefits, beneficiaries, sources of fi-
nancing, and procedures for receiving benefits.
Id. at 1373.
135 Holland v. Burlington Indus., 772 F.2d 1140, 1144-45 (4th Cir. 1985);Jung v. FMC
Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 710 n.2 (9th Cir. 1985); Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1503-
04 (9th Cir. 1985); Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1352 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 183 (1985).
136 Holland, 772 F.2d at 1148; Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir.
1985); Anderson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 759 F.2d 1518, 1520-21 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 410 (1985);Jung, 755 F.2d at 710-11; Blau, 748 F.2d at 1353; Sutton v. Weirton Steel
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fiduciary's conduct must not be arbitrary or capricious.1 7 Damages
available for breach of fiduciary duty include the enforcement of
future rights and compensatory damages, especially retroactive re-
instatement of benefits and return of out of pocket expenses.138
Damages for emotional distress and punitive damages have been
awarded as well.'
3 9
Courts are becoming increasingly liberal in determining that
the employer established a welfare benefit plan. 140 The courts' in-
quiry into the existence of a welfare benefit plan is similar to its
search for contract rights. Courts have implied welfare benefit
plans from the terms of employee handbooks,' 4 ' policy manuals, 142
oral representations, 143 and previous conduct of the defendant.
44
It is relatively easy for claimants to prove that the employer estab-
lished a welfare benefit plan. Courts, however, have not been so
liberal in finding that a fiduciary breached his duty to the plan.
Courts pay great deference to the fiduciary's decision. Their review
is similar to an appellate review of administrative findings.' 45 The
court must consider only the record before the fiduciary, 46 and
may only reverse the decision where the fiduciary acted arbitrarily,
capriciously, or in bad faith. 147 The court may consider whether
the fiduciary's decision conformed with the plan documents, 48 uni-
formly construed the plan document, 49 and was calculated to avoid
substantial cost to the employer. 50
This last factor favors the employer where the fiduciary carries
Div. of Nat'l Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 406, 410-11 (4th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1205
(1984); Sly v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 712 F.2d 1209, 1211-12 (7th Cir. 1983).
137 See cases cited at note 136 supra. Some courts suggest that this standard does not
apply to changes in the plan which deny benefits where the change was negotiated for in a
collective bargaining agreement. Sutton, 724 F.2d at 411. But see note 109 supra.
138 See Van Olson, supra note 65, at 405-06.
139 Id.
140 This trend is similar to the courts' liberal search for benefit contracts. See notes 93-
101 supra and accompanying text.
141 Holland, 772 F.2d at 1143.
142 Id.;Jung, 755 F.2d at 710-11; Sly, 712 F.2d at 1210-12.
143 Scott, 754 F.2d at 1503 n.1.
144 Id.; Sly, 712 F.2d at 1213; Adcock v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 616 F. Supp. 409,
422 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
145 Holland, 772 F.2d at 1148; Berry, 761 F.2d at 1006;Jung, 755 F.2d at 711; Blau, 748
F.2d at 1352; Adcock, 616 F. Supp. at 421. Congress refused to amend ERISA to provide for
de novo review of the administrator's denial of benefits without a presumption of correct-
ness. H.R. 6226, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
146 Beny, 761 F.2d at 1007.
147 Malhiot v. Southern Cal. Retail Clerks Union, 735 F.2d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied sub non. Jampol v. Southern Cal. Retail Clerks Union, 105 S. Ct. 959 (1985).
148 Blau, 748 F.2d at 1353; Sly, 712 F.2d at 1212; Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681
F.2d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 1982).
149 Dennard, 681 F.2d at 314.
150 Id.; Adcock, 616 F. Supp. at 421. See also Jung, 755 F.2d at 711.
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out his duty to defray reasonable expenses of the plan.' 5 ' Yet, a
fiduciary breaches his duty when he acts in the interest of the em-
ployer to avoid liability under the plan. 52 Flagrant violations of the
reporting and disclosure requirements are also "highly probative of
whether a particular decision to deny benefits was infected by its
having been made in conformity with an objectionable scheme."'
53
The fiduciary standards apply to the fiduciary as well as anyone act-
ing as a fiduciary.' 54 Nevertheless, because of the great deference
courts give to the decisionmaker, it is difficult to prevail under this
theory.
The fiduciary requirements, however, may provide a mecha-
nism through which the courts could require a fiduciary to establish
a fund to cover future liability under the plan.155 A fiduciary has a
duty of "providing benefits to participants"'' 56 under a welfare ben-
efit plan. It is foreseeable that the assets of a plan may not be suffi-
cient to cover its liabilities, 57 especially where retirees retain
benefits for life.' 5 8 It would be reasonable to require a fiduciary,
consistent with his duty to provide benefits, to establish a fund to
insure future benefits for participants. If a court found, pursuant to
its power to develop federal common law, that a fiduciary breached
its duty by not establishing such a fund, other fiduciaries would be
required to establish similar funds or risk being liable for breach of
their duties.' 59 In this way, the courts could insure that employers
would be able to live up to their obligations under the plan.' 60 This
151 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(A)(ii) (1982).
152 Northeast Dep't ILGWU Health and Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No.
229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 163-64 (3d Cir. 1985); Calhoun v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,
478 F. Supp. 357, 361 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
153 Blau, 748 F.2d at 1354.
154 Anderson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 759 F.2d 1518, 1521-22 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 410 (1985).
155 See Hearings on Aging, supra note 9, at 86 (testimony of Donald E. Fuerst, actuary).
156 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(a)(i) (1982).
157 In re Erie Lackawanna Ry. Co., 548 F.2d 621, 627 (6th Cir. 1977) (dire financial
position of company in bankruptcy may preclude recovery of insurance benefits); Adcock,
616 F. Supp. at 423-24 (employer's liability for severance pay to continue in the event suc-
cessor terminates employees). But see Hearings on Aging, supra note 9, at 74 (testimony of
Leon Lynch, Int'l Vice President, United Steel Workers of Am.) (union did not foresee
downturn in steel industry or seek a funding requirement for welfare benefit plans during
collective bargaining).
158 See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
159 Such a requirement may, however, conflict with other duties of the fiduciary such as
administering the plan to defray reasonable expenses, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(a)(ii) (1982),
and administering the plan in accordance with the plan document (where the document
calls for an unfunded plan), 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(D) (1982). Moreover, this would con-
flict with ERISA's exclusion of welfare benefit plans from funding requirements. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1081 (1982).
160 See notes 129-32 supra and accompanying text. The Financial Standards Accounting
Board recently required companies to post on their balance sheet unfunded liability for
post-retirement health care.
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solution, however, may be impractical because the cost of funding
currently unfunded post-retirement liability was estimated at two
trillion dollars.' 6 1
Required funding of welfare benefit plans would obviously ad-
vance ERISA's goal of "promoting the interests of employees and
their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans."' 162 Yet, in a recent
re-evaluation of welfare benefit regulation, Congress chose to re-
duce the tax incentives previously given to employers who volunta-
rily funded welfare benefit plans. 163 This action was not, however,
the final result of Congress' evaluation of welfare benefit plans-
rather, it was the beginning of the inquiry.
64
IV. Legislative Alternatives For Securing Welfare Benefit Rights
Congress is once again considering whether it should subject
welfare benefit plans to vesting and funding requirements. Legisla-
tion is currently pending before Congress which would extend
these requirements to welfare benefit plans in the limited context of
mergers and consolidations of plans or transfers of plan assets. 165
Congress has also charged the Department of the Treasury with
studying the broader alternative of applying vesting and funding
requirements to welfare benefit plans under all circumstances. 166
The pending legislation applies ERISA's vesting and funding
requirements to welfare benefit plans when plans are merged. 67 It
is designed to prevent cutbacks in benefits upon such mergers. 168
Congress targeted the bill at plan mergers associated with corpo-
rate mergers.' 69 In these cases, the successor employer would be
161 See Hearings on Aging, supra note 9, at 79 (testimony of Willis Goldbeck, President,
Washington Business Group on Health).
162 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). See Hearings on Aging, supra note 9, at 69 (testimony of
AnthonyJ. Gajda, economist).
163 The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), limited an employer's annual deduction from taxable in-
come for contributions to welfare benefit plans and eliminated the tax exempt growth of
welfare benefit funds. 26 U.S.C.A. § 419 (West Supp. 1985) (an exception was provided for
welfare benefit funds established to provide post-retirement life insurance). This resulted
in a shifting of a significant portion of the cost of welfare benefit plans from the government
back to employers. See Hearings on Labor-Management Relations, supra note 9, at 33, 39 (state-
ment of Dennis E. Ross, Acting Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel, Dep't of the Treasury).
164 See Hearings on Labor-Management Relations, supra note 9, at 30 (statement of Dennis E.
Ross, Acting Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel, Dep't of the Treasury).
165 H.R. 503, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); 131 CONG. REC. H81 (daily ed.Jan. 7, 1985).
166 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, § 561, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 901; see Hear-
ings on Aging, supra note 9, at 4 (statement of Rep. Daub).
167 H.R. 503, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); 131 CONG. REc. H81 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1985).
168 Id.
169 See Hearings on Labor-Management Relations, supra note 9, at 3 (testimony of Rep.
Brooks) (H.R. 5475 was reintroduced in the 99th Cong., 1st Sess. as H.R. 503.). The par-
ticular merger which prompted this legislation is the merger between Gulf Oil Co. and
Standard Oil of Cal. (Chevron).
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required to maintain the same level of benefits as his predeces-
sor.1 70 Presumably, this requirement would not burden the em-
ployer because his costs would be the same as the predecessor's.' 7'
Thus, this bill addresses the concern about cost to the employer,
which Congress expressed when it initially exempted welfare bene-
fit plans from vesting and funding. 72 This proposal also avoids the
problems employees face when trying to enforce benefits against
successors because of the doctrines of privity and successorship.' 73
On the other hand, mergers often take place when a company is
financially burdened.' 74 These circumstances necessitate cutting
costs to keep the company in business. Unfortunately, the current
proposal does not address this problem.
The legislation presents further problems. It does not prevent
changes in benefits prior to a merger because its provisions only
become effective upon a merger.' 75 It grants some employees pre-
ferred rights simply because their plan was merged with another. 176
Finally, it presents the more difficult problem of determining to
which benefits employees will obtain a vested right. 77
The question of which benefits should vest prompted Congress
to commission the Department of the Treasury to study this prob-
lem. The array of welfare benefits is more diverse than pension
benefits.' 78 A pension is only concerned with providing income in
the future.' 79 Welfare benefits encompass benefits ranging from
medical care to prepaid legal services.' 8 0 Within each category of
welfare benefits lies a wide range of alternative benefits.'18 There-
fore, the current vesting requirements may not be appropriate for
welfare benefit plans.
ERISA contains two types of vested benefits: defined contribu-
tion and defined benefits.' 8 2 Under a defined contribution plan, an
employee obtains a vested right to a stream of income attributable
170 Id.
171 See id. at 7-19 (statement and testimony of M. Diane Dwight).
172 See text accompanying note 63 supra.
173 See Hearings on Labor-Management Relations, supra note 9, at 8 (statement of M. Diane
Dwight).
174 Sell, A Critical Analysis of a New Approach to State Takeover Legislation After MITE, 23
WASHBURN LJ. 473 (1984).
175 See Hearings on Labor-Management Relations, supra note 9, at 13 (testimony of Congress-
man Erlenborn).
176 Id. at 14-15.
177 Id. at 21 (statement of Robert A.G. Monks, Administrator, Office of Pension and
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to the contributions. 83 If Congress applied this type of vesting to
welfare benefit plans, an employee would obtain a right to a dollar
value of benefits.' 8 4 This alternative would eliminate the problem
of determining which particular benefits vest. 8 5 The stream of in-
come, however, may be insufficient to purchase the anticipated ben-
efits. 186 This is especially true given recent increases in medical
benefit costs.
187
Employees may also obtain a vested right in a defined benefit
program. 188 Under a defined benefit plan the employee obtains a
vested right to the actual mix of welfare benefits.' 8 9 These plans
are funded by contributing an actuarially determined amount to the
plan which is predicted to yield the prescribed benefits at a future
date. 90 Because of the diverse array of welfare benefits, 91 and
changing benefit needs, 192 the vested benefit may become obsolete.
The task of defining comparable benefits "would create an adminis-
trative nightmare."' 9 3 Because benefits are likely to change, one
must first determine when welfare benefits vest before they can as-
certain which benefits were vested.
Determining when a welfare benefit vests is more complex than
the vesting of pension benefits. 194 Unlike pension benefits, employ-
ees rely on welfare benefits during their working years. This factor
alone suggests that welfare benefits should vest immediately upon
hiring. But this would not be practical because, given today's mo-
bile workforce, employees may accrue welfare benefits from several
sources.' 95 The duplication of benefits would needlessly increase
the cost to employers and operate as a disincentive for establishing
welfare benefit plans. 96 The alternative of vesting upon retirement
183 Id. at 67-68.
184 See Hearings on Labor-Management Relations, supra note 9, at 21 (Statement of Robert
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192 Benefits such as day care, prepaid legal services, and cafeteria style benefits are rela-
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would operate as a disincentive to hire older workers. 197 Congress,
after some study, could likely balance these concerns and arrive at
alternative vesting schedules similar to those which apply to pen-
sion plans whereby welfare benefits would vest at some point dur-
ing the employment relationship. 198
Congress must answer several questions before it can extend
vesting and funding requirements to welfare benefit plans. Con-
gress studied pension plans for ten years before enacting ERISA. 199
Although Congress answered many questions about employee ben-
efits in that time, welfare benefit reform is expected to take several
years. 200 In the meantime, employees must rely on the judiciary to
secure welfare benefit rights.
V. Conclusion
Welfare benefit plans are not subject to all of the requirements
of ERISA. Because of this gap in ERISA, employees have difficulty
securing rights to welfare benefits. The federal courts are develop-
ing a rule of common law to provide a vehicle to extend ERISA's
protection to welfare benefit plans. The court's authority for devel-
oping a rule of common law of welfare benefits plans is questiona-
ble in view of the legislative history of ERISA. Nevertheless, courts
have used the common law to enforce contract rights to welfare
benefits and to vest rights to benefits in employees when they attain
retirement status. They have also used the common law to enforce
welfare benefit rights through ERISA's fiduciary requirements.
Congress is currently considering extending ERISA's funding
and vesting requirements to welfare benefit plans. This would
eliminate any question of the courts' authority to enforce welfare
benefit rights. But this is a complex issue which is expected to take
several years to resolve. Because of the potential for abuse by plan
providers and the serious consequences that a loss of benefits has
for retirees, courts should continue to apply the common law to
welfare benefit plans. Courts have the flexibility to take into ac-
count Congress' initial concern of reaching a balance between
meaningful reform and reasonable cost to employers. By doing so
they will continue to forward ERISA's policy of promoting the in-
terests of employees in benefit plans.
Michael I. Richardson
197 Id.
198 See Hearings on Labor-Management Relations, supra note 9, at 21 (Statement of Robert
A.G. Monks, Administrator, Office of Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs, U.S. Dep't of
Labor).
199 Id. at 22.
200 Id.
1986] NOTES
